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Abstract
Static structural models are considered, explaining labour supply of husband and
wife in Irish families. It is assumed that the family chooses the optimal point in a
finite set. Account is taken of nonlinearities and nonconvexities in the Irish system
of income taxes and benefits, and of prediction errors in wages of nonworkers.
Moreover, the neoclassical model is extended such that information on involuntary
unemployment is incorporated in a structural way. Smooth simulated maximum
likelihood is used to estimate the models, using ESRI household data drawn in
1987.
Compared to most EC countries, labour supply of married females in Ireland
is very low. The Irish tax system is characterized by "income splitting" so that the
tax liability of the couple depends essentially on the joint income of husband and
wife. A central question in the paper is the extent to which this tax system can
explain the low participation rate of married women. We analyse the sensitivity of
husbands' and wives' labour supply with respect to their own wage and that of
their partner, and with respect to other income, and compare male and female
labour supply under the actual and alternative tax regimes.
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1. Introduction
Married women's participation in the paid labour market is much lower in
Ireland than in many other industrialized countries. The hannonized EC Labour
Force Survey shows that in 1987 about 29 per cent of married women in Ireland
were "economically active" (working for pay or profit, or unemployed according to
the standard ILO definition). This compared with an EC average of 42 per cent.
The same source shows activity rates for married men in Ireland at 81 per cent,
significantly above the EC average of 73 per cent~. For single men and women the
Irish activity rates were very close to the EC averages. Turning to hours of work,
we find that part-time work is much less common in Ireland than in many EC
countries. In 198617 about 6 per cent of total employment in Ireland was in part-
time jobs - as against 10 to 25 per cent in France, Belgium, Germany, the UK,
Denmark and the Netherlands (OECD, 1988). For women the contrast is still more
striking: only 14 per cent of female employment was in part-time jobs, as against
23 to 45 per cent in these other countries.
Many factors are relevant to these contrasts: differences in fertility rates,
national child care policies, differences in the nature of labour demand and so on.
In this paper, however, we focus on the possible role of the Irish income tax and
social security~welfare systems in shaping the patterns of labour market participa-
tion observed. Under the Irish system, a married couple's income tax liability
depends essentially on their joint income. This is often seen as a disincentive for
female labour market participation. After a small "earned income allowance" the
marginal tax rate on the initial earnings of the wife is equal to the marginal tax rate
on the last pound earned by the (usually full-time working) husband. In the case of
fully independent taxation, the marginal tax rate on the first hour worked by the
wife would be much smaller. Changing from joint to independent taxation might
therefore lead to increased participation by married women. It might even be an
incentive for husband and wife to strive for a more equal distribution of paid work.
For example, assume that both partners' before tax wage rates are equal. Before
tax family earníngs if both partners work 24 hours per week, will then be the same
as before tax earnings if the husband works 48 hours and the wife dces not work at
a1L Independent taxation with progressive rates however implies that after tax ear-
nings will be larger in the former case than in the latter.
The extent to which labour supply of husband and wife depends on the tax
system strongly depends on the sensitivity of male and female labour supply with
respect to the own and the partner's wage rate and with respect to nonlabour
income. We develop a structural family labour supply model for Ireland from
which these sensitivities can be derived. The estimates are used in a micro-simula-
' While this partly retlects high participation among married men over the age of 65, higher
than average participation rates (including those who are unemployed) are also recorded for all
other age groups.3
tion model to analyse labour supply under the actual Irish tax and benefits system
and under alternative systems. The results have clear implications for the extent to
which male and female labour supply could be affected by changing the tax rules.
Recently, the impact of taxation on labour supply has received a lot of
attention. The most common framework is the neoclassical static model of indivi-
dual labour supply. See e.g. the articles in Moffitt (1990) for several applications
to European and US data sets. The prototype model is Hausman (1985). Many
generalisations have been discussed, allowing for fixed costs of working, unem-
ployment benefits, or institutional and demand side restrictions on hours worked.
For households with two adults, the individual approach is often justified by
considering the spouses' decisions recursively: the husband decides first, without
taking account of e.g. the wife's wage rate, and the wife decides conditionally upon
her husband's labour supply and earnings. This approach implies that the wife's
earnings capacity or employment opportunities do not affect the husband's labour
supply decision.
In this paper we avoid imposing these restrictions a priori. Husband and
wife are treated in a symmetric way: their labour supply is modeled simultane-
ously. The natural extension of the individual model, is the model based on joint
utility maximisation of a utility function, with family consumer expenditures, the
husband's leisure, and the wife's leisure as its arguments. This is the framework
we use, following, for example, Hausman and Ruud (1984), Ransom (1987, 1989),
and Kapteyn et al. (1990).
In all these models, hours worked by the two spouses are treated as mixed
discrete and continuous random variables. First order conditions are used to derive
leisure demand. This requires that second order conditions have to be satisfied, i.e.
the utility function must be quasi-concave (cf. Van Scest et al. (1993) for an
extensive discussion). Moreover, utility maximisation in this type of models
becomes computationally intricate in case of nonstandard restrictions. Each
generalisation of the budget set (nonlinear taxation, unemployment benefits, fixed
costs, hours constraints) leads to new nonstandard problems. This limits the extent
to which policy measures can be analysed.
Van Scest (1992) discusses advantages and drawbacks of the continuous
models. He introduces a discrete family labour supply model, which does not share
the drawbacks of the continuous model, while the advantages are retained. The
main idea is that the choice set is assumed to be finite. The alternative yielding
highest utility is chosen. This means that a finite number of utilities is compared,
and does not require or convexity conditions on either budget set or preferences.
The model is fully structural, in [he sense that policy simulations which are
possible in the continuous model remain feasible. The models analysed in this
paper are similar to the Van Scest (1992) model.
This paper is organised as follows. A brief description of the theoretical
model is presented in section 2. In section 3 we describe the data: the household
survey conducted in 1987 by the Economic and Social Research Institute. Section 4
describes the main features of the Irish tax and benefits systems, incorporated in4
the structural model. In section 5, we present the estimation results, and section 6
contains the resuhs of some micro-simulations, leading to policy conclusions about
the effect of taxes and benefits. Conclusions are drawn in section 7.
2. The Structural Model
This section is largely based upon Van Scest (1992). We start with the basic
model and then present extensions. We assume that the family decides on income
(y), male leisure (lm), and female leisure (1~). The framework is static, i.e. savings
and intertemporal consumption smoothing are not taken into account.2 Leisure is
related to working hours (hm, h~) through the relations 1m-TE-h,,, and if-TE-h~.
Here TE is the time endowment, set equal to 80 hours per week. We assume that
the family operates as a single decision unit and maximises the following direct
translog utility function:
U(v) - v'Av ~- b'v (1)
Here v-(log y, log I~n, log l~)', [he vector of logs of quantities. A is a symmetric
3x3 matrix with entries A;j (i,j-1,2,3), and b-(bt,b,,b3)'. Preference variation
across families through observed characteristics is incorporated through the
parameters:
b;- Ek (3;~Xk, 1-1,2,3,
(2)
Aij - ~k aijkxk~ t~~-1.2.3.
where x is a vector of family characteristics, such as family composition or the
husband's or wife's age. The index indicating the family is suppressed.
We assume that the family always chooses a point at the edge of its budget
set. This means that the model only makes economic sense if, for relevant values
of (y,lm,lt), U is increasing with y. If U increases with y, it is easy to derive a
necessary and sufficient condition for quasi-concavity of preferences. We do not
impose quasi-concavity, since, as will be explained below, it is neither required for
the statistical model, nor for its economic interpretation. We shall check ex post in
how many observations quasi-concavity is violated.
Before tax hourly wage rates wm and w~ are assumed to be exogenous and
independent of hours worked. To each individual corresponds one wage rate. Thus,
once lm and 1~ are chosen, after tax income y is completely determined by w,,, and
2 If income were replaced by consumption expenditures, the model would be consistent with a
life cycle framework with additive preferences over time (cf. Blundell and Walker, 1986). Since
the data contain very limited information on expenditures or savings, this approach could not be
followed.5
wr and the tax and benefits system. The rules of this system vary with family
composition, also assumed to be exogenous. A description of the main features of
the Irish tax and benefits system, is given in section 4. We denote after tax income
resulting from tax and benefits rules, for given wage rates and family composition,
by y-lnc(Im,lr; w,~,wr,x).
In the standard continuous model, as in Hausman and Ruud (1984), for
example, the family solves the problem
Max U(Y,lm,lr) s.t. ySInc(1m,Ir;wm,Wnx), 1mcTE, 1r~TE
Under the assumption that U increases in y, this can be rewritten as
Max U(Inc(lm,lr;wm,wr,x),Im,lr) s.t. ImSTE, 1r5TE. (3)
This problem can be solved using Lagrange techniques. The complexity of the
solution strongly depends on the nature of the tax and benefits rules, i.e. the form
of the budget set. For a system as complex as the Irish one, many regimes would
have to be distinguished, and the approach seems practically infeasible.
Our approach is to replace the budget set by a finite number of points on its
edge. The family then solves:
Max U(Y,lm,lr) s.t. (Y,Im,lr)ECS(wm,wr,x),
where the choice set is given by
CS(Wm,Wr,X) -
{(y,TE-hm,TE-hr);h~n,hrE {O,IL,...,(m;,,a 1)IL},y-InC(lm,lr;w~n,wr,x)}
We thus only consider numbers of working hours per week which are multiples of
a fixed interval length IL. The choice set contains mram-m2"d points. In the data,
most integer values of actual working hours between 1 and 60 are present, and
IL-1 seems natural. To limit the computational burden however, we use IL-8
and m;,,d-8. Observed hours are rounded to a multiple of 8 and censored at 56.
The rounding error can be seen as a drawback of this approach. Van Scest (1992)
however compares results based on different values of m~~d and concludes that
differences are small.
Random disturbances are added to the utilities of all choice opportunities
j-1,...,mr81T1 in the same way as in the multinomial logit model (cf., e.g., Madd-
ala, 1983):
U~ - U(y~,1m~,1~) f e~, (j-1,...,mram) (4)
e~ - EV(I) Q-1,...,mrem); e~, j-l,mrem, mutually independent,6
where EV(I) denotes the type 1 extreme value distribution with cumulative prob-
ability function Pr[e~ G t] -exp(-exp(-t)) (t E IR). We assume that the family chooses
j for which U~ is largest. The probability that j is chosen is given by
Pr[U~ ? Uk for all k] - expN(Yi,lmi,lr))I Ek exp(U(Yk~lmk,l~)) (5)
The assumption that the mfam errors are independently identically distributed limits
flexibility of the error structure of the modeL It is necessary to obtain the simple
expressions for the probabilities in (2.6). The error structure of the model can be
compared with the one in traditíonal kinked budget constraint models, which
usually include random preferences and~or optimisation errors. In case of family
labour supply, both types of errors would typically be bivariate.
The e~ can be interpreted as unobserved alternative specific utility compo-
nents or errors in perception of the alternatives' utilities. They cannot be inter-
preted as random preferences due to unobserved family characteristics. Still, the
large number of errors incorporated, one for each alternative, suggests that in
practice these errors might pick up part of the random preferences effects. Explicit
incorporation of random preferences through bl and b~ is considered in Van Scest
(1992). It does not lead to significant improvement in his case.
We have to adjust the model presented above in two ways, to obtain a model
which is empirically feasible. First, wage rates of nonworkers are unobserved.
Second, the data contain few people working part-time, and the model described
above will strongly overpredict the number of part-time jobs.
Unobserved wage rates
In the literature, the unobserved wage rates problem is usually solved in one
of the following ways. The first is to ignore observations on nonworkers and
estimate the model conditional on participation. This leads to consistent but
inefficient estimates. This problem might be quite serious in our case, because of
the low participation rate of married women. The other solutions are based upon
preliminary estimates of a wage equation. Either unknown, or both known and
unknown wage rates are replaced by predictions. The latter leads to inconsistent
estimates in general, unless the labour supply model is linear in log wages. The
former moreover has the drawback that the implemented wage rate depends on the
labour supply decision, which makes it endogenous.
A feasible way to take account of the unobserved wage rates problem is to
consider the full model consisting of labour supply equations and wage equations.
Again, we follow Van Scest (1992). The (before tax) wage equations are given by
log wm - Zm'~rm -t- um; log wf - Zt'ut f ut (6)
Zm and Zt are vectors of individual characteristics, such as education level,
potential experience, region- and education-specific unemployment rates (see Table7
I for details). The errors u,,, and ur are assumed to be normally distributed with
mean zero, independent of the regressors and of each other. Because it is assumed
that before tax wage rates do not depend on hours worked, the model has a
recursive structure: wage rates (of both spouses) are determined irrespective of
labour supply, and labour supply is then determined conditional on the wage rates.
If both spouses work, the likelihood contribution of the household can be written as
LC - fm~(wm,wr) I-(h,n,hr~wm,wr) (~)
Here fmr denotes the density of (um,ur) (the product of two univariate normals), and
the second factor is the labour supply model probability in (5), for the observed
choice (hm,hr), which depends on wm and wr via the budget function Inc. If all
wages were observed, (7) could be used to estimate labour supply and wage
equations simultaneously by ML.
If one or two spouses do not work, (7) cannot be used, because wm or wr or
both are unobserved. Let us consider the case that both are unobserved. The
likelihood contribution is then given by
LC - E{L(h,,,,hr~w,,,.wr)} (8)
where the expectation is taken with respect to wm and wr. This involves bivariate
integration of [he function given in (5). No analytical expression for the expectation
exists, and numerical integration at each step of the ML optimisation routine is
time consuming. A practical solution is to make use of recently developed estima-
tion by simulation techniques. We use smooth simulated maximum likelihood. This
boils down to replacing the expectation in (8) by a simulated sample mean:
LCS - R-~ Er L(hm,hr l wmr~wG) (9)
where the sum is taken over R independent draws of wm and wr (conditional on the
regressors), computed by transforming draws of the standardized errors in (6) from
N,(0,1).
A similar expression can be given if one of the wage rates is unobserved,
using draws of one of the errors only. If R is large, the simulated likelihood
contribution in (9) will, with high probability, be similar to the exact contribution
in (8). The simulated maximum likelihood estimator is obtained by replacing LC by
LCS for all families with at least one nonworker, and maximising the approximate
sample likelihood which thus results.
Properties of the resulting estimator depend on the choice of R. The estima-
tor is consistent if R tends to infinity with the number of observations N, and
asymptotically equivalent to ML if RN-~h tends to infinity, provided that draws are
independent across observations (cf. Gourieroux and Monfort, 1993). Moreover,
LCS is a smooth function of the parameters of the model, and is guaranteed to be
positive. Results of, for example, Stern (1992) and Callan and Van Scest (1993)8
suggest that this implies that the approximation works well with few draws per
observation. We obtained results for values of R ranging from 1 to 18, with
independent draws across observations.
Hours restrictions
Preliminary estimation results with the model described above suggest that it
dces not capture the data very well: it overpredicts the number of part-time jobs of
males as well as females, and underpredicts nonparticipation and the number of
full-time jobs. This finding is similar to those of, for example, Dickens and
Lundberg (1993), Tummers and Woitiiez (1991), Van Scest et al. (1990). The
standard model thus appears to be misspecified. This may lead to biased con-
clusions about wage rate elasticities etc. Van Soest (1992) finds that elasticities
decrease substantially if a mechanism is incorporated in the model that accounts for
the lack of part-time jobs.
Several explanations for the lack of part-time jobs can be given. Because of
fixed costs of hiring workers, or, equivalently, increasing returns to scale of the
worker's production, employers may be reluctant to hire part-time workers. This
may imply that part-time jobs are scarce and average search costs for a part-time
job will be relatively high. We allow for this by including alternative specific
constant terrns for the (h,,,,hr) combinations in which husband or wife or both work
part-time. These constants thus reflect drawbacks of working part-time, e.g. search
costs of unattractive job characteristics.3 Equation (1) is thus replaced by
U(v) - v'Av f b'v f ry,(v,) -I- ry3(v3) (10)
where ti; (i-2,3) depends on v; (log leisure) through working hours h; as follows:
ry;(v) - So; ~- Sr; h, for h-TE-exp(v) E{8,16,24,32}
(11)
~y;(v) - 0 otherwise
We thus assume that the nonzero ry; depend linearly on hours worked, implying
four restrictions on the eight nonzero y;. Parameterizing the y; in this way has the
advantage that the ntrmber of parameters in the model dces not depend upon the
choice of IL or m;,,~. The linearity assumption can easily be tested, and so can the
assurnption that the ry; do not depend on regressors such as age and family compo-
sition. We expect the ry; to be negative, reflecting the 'disutility' of part-time jobs.
We have no a priori expectations about the signs of Sr, and 513.
' An alternative would be to assume that wage rates of part-time jobs are lower than for full-
time jobs (cf. Moftitt, 1984). Tummers and Woittiez (1991) find that this cannot fully explain the
lack of pan-time jobs.9
A generalised double hurdle model
In the model described above, we have taken account of search costs for
part-time jobs. We now extend the model to take full account of involuntary
unemploymcnt. To estimate the extended model, we use information on the desired
employment status of nonworkers. To all nonworkers, a question has been asked
on whether they would like to work or not (cf. section 3). We use this information
to construct dummy variables Im and I~. Im-1 if the husband is involuntary unem-
ployed, Im-O if he is employed or has no desire to work. I~ is defined likewise for
females.
We add separate equations to explain I,,, and I~. The extended model is a
generalisation of the double hurdle model of Blundell et al. (1987). An individual is
employed if two conditions are satisfied. First, desired labour supply, denoted by
h,~, or h~, must be positive. This is the outcome of the labour supply model
discussed so far (including, for example, potential search costs for part-time jobs).
Second, he or she must not be hampered by other hurdles preventing employment.
These are modelled by two extra equations. The specification of Im and 1f becomes:
I;'-V;~;fe;; 1;-1 if I; ~0 and h; 10; I;-O otherwise; e;-N(0,1) (i-m,f) (12)
The sign of I; determines whether individual i will be involuntary unemployed if
desired hours are positive. For people who desire to work (h~ ~0), we know
whether they have a job or not, so we know the sign of 1` ;. For those who are not
interested in working (h;-0, I;-O), we do not know whether they would find a job
if they desired one, so the sign of I; is unknown. V; is a vector of exogenous
individuai characteristics. We assume that the e; are independent of all regressors
and of other errors in the model. We also assume that em and e~ are independent. I;
therefore dces not depend on the wage rate. We include age and education level in
V;, to account for the effect of productivity on involuntary unemployment.
The (simulated) likelihood contribution LC of each household can be
adjusted to account for involuntary unemployment. The main point is that not
working can be due to the labour supply part of the model or to involuntary
unemployment. Observed variables Im and I~ are used to distinguish the regimes,
but are only helpful if desired hours are positive. Moreover, we assume that each
individual takes account of involuntary unemployment of the spouse: If I~50, the
husband's labour supply is conditional upon h~-0, i.e. he maximizes family utility
subject to h~-0. Nine cases are to be considered.
I. hm10, h~~0: LC - P[I,;,50] P[I~50] LC~`
LC~` is the likelihood in the labour supply model without second hurdle, for
this case given in (7).
II. hm ~ 0, hr-0, If-0: LC - P[I„ c0] LCS~`lo
LCS~` denotes the simulated likelihood contribution, based on draws of wf.
Since the wife is not interested in working, we do not know whether she
would find a job if she desired one: The sign of If is not known.
III. h,,,~0, ht-0, I~-1: LC - P[I,;,~O] P[I~10] LCSWU~`
LCSWU~` denotes the (simulated) probability that the wife's desired hours
are positive, and that the husband's hours equal his observed hours, given
the rationing hr-0.4
IV. hm-0, hf70, Im-O: LC - P[I~50] LCS~`
This is the same as II, with husband and wife interchanged.
V. hm-0, ht10, 1,,,-1: LC - P[I,;,70] P[IfcO] LCSHU~`
This is the same as III, with husband and wife interchanged.
VI. hm-0, h~-0, 1,,,-0, I~-O:
LC -{1-P[I,;,10]P[I~JO]} LCSs` f P[Im10]P[I~JO] LCSHWUs`
LCSHWU~` denotes the (simulated) probability that, conditional upon hf-0,
the husband prefers not to work, and, conditional upon hm-0, the wife dces
not want to work.s
VII. hm-0, hr-0, Im-O, It-1:
LC - P[I~10]{P[I,;,cO] LCSWU~` f P[I,n10] LCSHWU~`}
Now LCSHWU~` is the probability that, conditional upon hf-0, the husband
has no desire to work, while, conditional upon hm-0, the wife would like to
work.b
4 For given wage rates and observed hours h,,,10 uf the male, this probability is given by the
probahility that (h,,,,0) is preferred to all other pairs (h,0) (with curresponding family income),
minus tha prubability that (hm,0) is preferred to all other pairs (h~,h,). These are both multinomial
logit probabilities, with m;,,d and m~,,,, alternatives, respectively.
5 It implies that (0,0) is preferred to all other pairs (h,0) and (O,h). This is a muttinomial logit
probability with 2m;,,oI alternatives.
6 This means that (0,0) is preferred to all other pairs (h,0), but not to all other pairs (O,h). It
can be computed as the probability that (0,0) is preferred to all (h,0), minus the probability that
(0,0) is preferrecJ to all (O,h) and all (h,0).Il
VIII. hm-0, ht-0, Im-1, Ir-O:
LC - P[ImJO]{P[I~cO] LCSHU' f P[I~10] LCSHWU~`}
The same as VII, with husband and wife interchanged.
IX. hm-Q hf-0, Im-1, It-1: LC - P[I„10]P[I~~O]LCSHWUs`
LCSHWU~` is the probability that, conditional upon ht-0, the husband
prefers to work, and, conditiona) upon hm-0, the wife prefers to work.~
3. Data and Sample Characteristics
The data used were drawn from the ESRI's 1987 Survey of Income Distribu-
tion, Poverty and Usage of State Services - a nationwide stratified, clustered
random sample drawn from the Electoral Register. The survey included informa-
tion on labour force status, current and usual gross (i.e. pre-tax) pay, usual hours
of work and details of other income gathered, where possible, directly from the
individuals concerned.g Here we concentrate on married couples, where each
partner is aged between 15 and 59, and neither partner is self-employed. This
gives observations on a total of 1266 families. For some individuals however, only
an abbreviated questionnaire was completed, without information on the age of the
wife at marriage, chronic illness dummies or (for those not at work) the informa-
tion on desired work hours and search activity used to construct the involun[ary
unemployment dummies. We limit ourselves to the sample of 1001 families in
which complete information on both partners is available. The means and standard
deviations of the variables used in the analysis are set out in Table 1.
Employment rates for married men and women in the sample (69 per cent
and 21 per cent respectively) are not directly comparable with published participa-
tion rates from the national Labour Force Survey, which include a substantial
element of self-employtnent and farming. For 53 per cent of the sample families
the husband is the only paid worker, as against 5 per cent of cases in which the
wife is the sole earner. Neither partner had a paid job in 26 per cent of cases,
while both partners were in paid employment in 16 per cent of families.
Gross wage rates for the analysis are computed from usual gross pay per
week and usual hours per week. Usual gross pay and usual hours both include
regular paid overtime. As noted in Section 2, it is assumed lhat gross wage rates
~ This means that (0,0) is neither preferred to all (O,h), nor to all (h,0). The probability can
be computed as I- P((0,0) preferred to all (O,h)J - P((0,0) preferred to all (h,0)j f P[(0,0)
preferred to all (O,h) and all (h,0)j.
e For a full description of the survey see Callan, Nolan et aL (1989).Iz
do not depend on hours worked; for relaxations of this assumption see Moffitt
(1984) and Tummers and Woittiez (1991).
Less than 3 per cent of the male employees in the sample work fewer than
30 hours per week. By contrast, almost 40 per cent of the female employees fall
into this category. A significant proportion of these women are teachers employed
on a standard contract, and not usually thought of as par[-time workers. The
weekly hours of work of male and female teachers may be somewhat understated
(they may have reported hours of attendance at school, excluding time spent in
preparation or correction). However, no account was taken of the fact that this pro-
fession also has much longer than usual holiday periods, which would tend to
counterbalance this factor in the calculation of gross hourly wage rates.
Table 1: Sarnple statistirs
Variable De.rcriplian Mean S.D.
AGEH age of husband 41.82 9.63
AGEW age of wife 38.60 9.40
AGEMARW age of wife at marriage 22.86 3.92
TOWN dummy: town I500-10000 0.15 0.36
BIGTOWN dummy : town IOOOOt 0.12 0.33
C1TY dummy : city borough 0.09 0.29
DUBLIN dummy : Duhlin 0.31 0.46
DILLNF dummy: chrunic illnass, wife 0.14 0.34
DILLNM dummy: chronic illness, hushand 0. t4 0.35
EDLEVM eclucation level, husband 3.80 2.27
EDLEVF eclucation level, wife 3.91 2.I l
EUERM unemploymant rate ~ hushand's EDLEV 2I.51 8.47
EUERF unemployment rate ~ wife's EDLEV 9.I0 4.99
GOPENM husband's gross occup'1 pensionlweek 0.95 1 L3
GOPENF wife's gross occup'I pensionlweek 0 0
MGEINT annual mortgage interest 608.97 929.33
NCAPY net capital income per week 3.88 15.77
NCHCB number of chilJren for child henefit 2.10 I.56
PEXPH potential experience, husband 24.96 10.24
PEXPW potential experience, wife 22.67 9.90
RUERTW regional unemploymen[ ra[e 17.37 2.06
UHRSH usual hours per week, hushand 29.85 21.41
UHRSW usual hours per weCk, wife 6.44 13.87
URBAN dummy: urhan arra 0.52 0.50
UWAGEH usual pre-tax wage per hour, husband 6.23 4.27
UWAGEW usual pro-tax wage per hour, wife 4.52 2.72
WORKH Jummy: husband is employed 0.69 0.46
WORKW dummy: wife is employexl 0.21 0.41
YNGO-4 dummy: youngest chilJ aged 0 to 4 0.41 0.49
12 dummv: vouncest child aeecl 5 to 12 0.29 0.4513
The variables Im and It, distinguishing involuntary unemployment from
nonparticipation, are constructed from the answers to a series of questions on
search activity and desired working hours. The questions leave each nonworker the
choice between six alternatives. These are set out in Table 2, together with their
frequency distribution for males and females. In order to take full account of the
desired labour supply of discouraged workers, i.e., those who are not looking for
work but still want a part-time or full-time job, they are categorized as involuntar-
ily unemployed, along with those who are actually looking for work.9 Thus, Im
and if are set equal to one if the individual's answer is anything but zero. Accord-
ing to this classification, 71 per cent of males without a job, and 24 per cent of
females without a job, are involuntarily unemployed. 9 per cent of all males and
60 per cent of all females, are interested in neither full-time nor part-time work.
Table 2: Involwuary Unemployment
Nonworkers only; percentage ofall nonworkers
Value Description Males Femaks
1 wants part-time job, not looking 0.9 10.4
2 wants full-timejob, not looking 7.4 2.9
3 looking for ajob, no specific info on search activity 12.9 2.9
4 searching: studieel aJsl other search activity 2L7 4.8
5 searching: answered adsl wrote to employers 27.5 3.3
0 none of the ahove 29.1 75.8
tntal numbrr of non-workers 309 79 .
4. Construction of budget sets
The basic budget set is constructed from information on the gross hourly
wage rate, together with information on non-labour incomes. We distinguish
between four main types of non-labour income: occupational pensions, capital
income, child benefit, and social security entitlements for those not in work.
Occupational pension income is subject to tax, but not to social insurance (PRSI).
Capital income is mostly taxed at source, so that it is treated simply as an addition
to after-tax income. Child benefit is not subject to tax, and is paid at the same rate
whether the parent(s) are in paid employment or not. Short-term social security
benefits were not, at the time of the survey, subject to tax.
The income tax system is quite closely modelled. In addition to the basic
personal allowance, we take account of two smaller "earned income" allowances
for employees,lo as well as tax relief on mortgage interest payments, the main
9 While exact comparisons are not possible, it is clear that the extent of ineasured unemploy-
ment for marrietl women under this procedure is well above that shown by official figures.
~o The PAYE allowance, for all employees, and the PRSI allowance, for those employees
paying the full rate of Pay-Related ~ocial Insurance.14
deduction allowed. The initial tax rate at the time of the survey was 35 per cent,
which applied to the first f4,700 per annum, with a higher tax rate of 48 per cent
applying to the next f2,800 per annum. A top tax rate of 58 per cent applied to
income above these levels. Married couples were entitled to (fully transferable)
double allowances and double rate bands, irrespective of their labour force status
i.e. their tax liabilities depended essentially on their joint income, which was taxed
as if each was a single person with half that income.tt An exemption limit, some-
what above the basic allowances, and "marginal relief" for taxpayers just above
that limit, are also taken into account. The basic structure of social insurance
contributions is also taken into account in constructing [he budget constraints: a
proportionate tax at a rate of 6.75 per cent up to a ceiling at about one-and-a-half
times the average industrial wage, coupled with a levy on all income of 1 per cent.
A simpler approach was adopted to the modelling of social security entitle-
ments. Under the actual system, an individual might be entitled to Unemployment
Benefit, if he or she had an adequate social insurance contribution record - some-
thing which would depend on the nature of his or her employment, and the
continuity of that employment. We ignore such possible entitlements for two
reasons. First, they may depend on labour market history in the manner described,
and therefore be correlated with time-persistent unobserved individual characteris-
tics. Second, Unemployment Benefit is in any case of limited duration, so that
ultimately an unemployed person must depend on what is termed Unemployment
Assistance. Given the static nature of the model, and the fact that most of the
unemployed were long-term unemployed, it would seem that it is the rate of
Unemployment Assistance for the long-term unemployed which is of greatest
relevance to the present analysis. Essentially, the Unemployment Assistance
entitlement is modelled as a"safety-net" income level for the family unit: if net
income from all other sources falls below this Floor, then social welfare payments
bring the income back up to the safety-net level (about ~3,300 per annum for a
couple, with additions of between f400 and f500 per child). While the actual
system is considerably more complex than this simple representation, the simplified
model captures the two most important features of the system from a labour supply
point of view: it provides a floor below which income cannot fall, at a level which
depends on the number of children in the family, and it imposes a very high rate of
benefit withdrawal. t'-
The effect of this tax and benefit regime on the incentive to take up a job is
illustrated in Figure 1. This shows the average effective tax rate facing a man or
woman choosing between 0,8,16,24,32 and 40 hours of work per week at some-
thing close to the average industrial wage (f5 per hour) when the spouse is unem-
~~ The "earned income" allowances were not transferable.
12 In taking Unemployment Assistance as the floor to incomes for those in and out of
employment, we ignore the potential entitlement of low-income employees with children to Family
Income Supplement. Few of those entitled to the benetit claimed or received iC the estimated take-
up rate was below 30 per cent on a caseload basis (Callan, Nolan et al., 1989)15
ployed, has a full-time job at f5 per hour, half that wage or twice that wage. If
the spouse is unemployed, or has very low earnings, the income floor provided by
the (family unit) benefit system comes into play. The pound-for-pound withdrawal
of income under that system creates very high effective tax rates even on a full-
time job at the average industrial wage.13 But at higher income levels, effective
tax rates on a second earner are still very high - typically close to or above 40 per
cent - even though the benefit system is no longer relevant. The second earner
faces the full impact of the progressive tax system, because of the fully transferable
allowances and rate bands: apart from a small amount, he or she faces the same tax
rate on initial earnings as that applying to the last pound of his or her spouse's
earnings.
Figure 1 also illustrates the average effective tax rates for an alternative,
fully independent tax system. Under this system, husband and wife would be taxed
separately, with no transferability of allowances or of rate bands. If allowances and
rate bands are equal to the current amounts for individuals (i.e. 50 per cent of
current amounts for married couples), this would generate substantial additional tax
revenue where husband and wife have very different incomes. We estimate that for
the sample of individuals used here, a proportionate revenue-neutral reduction of
tax rates would reduce the rates from 35, 48 and 58 per cent to 25.5, 36 and 43
per cent respectively - a reduction of more than one-quarter. Implicit average
effective tax rates on earnings for this revenue-neutral scheme are illustrated as the
lower line in Figure 1. Where the spouse was unemployed the effective tax rates on
earnings would still be very similar to the top line, because the benefit system
remains the same. But independence of taxation, even without independence of
benefits gives very substantial reductions in the effective tax rates on a second
earner.
The two tax systems described thus far can be regarded as polar extremes.
Many intermediate systems are also possible.14 One which is often referred to as
"independent taxation" can be regarded as deviating from the fully independent
system by tnaking "unused" allowances transferable between spouses.ts We will
refer to this option as "quasi-independent taxation". The revenue-neutral tax rates
for this system are about 31.5 per cent, 43.5 per cent and 52.5 per cent.
Table 3 shows the average effective tax rates on second earners under the
three systems, when applied in a revenue-neutral way. In general, effective rates
for "independent taxation" are lower than those for "income splitting" while rates
for "quasi-independent taxation" lie between these extremes. It is possible, how-
ever, for the effective rate under quasi-independent taxation to exceed the rate for
the income-splitting system: the fact that only unused allowances can be transferred
13 This can be viewed as a high "replacement rate" for loss of earnings.
14 The present UK system represents one such possibility,
r3 An alternative is to make all allowances fully transferable between spouses. This system is
very similar to the quasi-independent system described here.16
means that the initial earnings of a second earner are in effect taxed at the marginal
tax rate of the first earner (just as under the income-splitting system), and this rate
may increase in the move from an income-splitting to a quasi-independent sys-
tem. tb
From the table we can see that quasi-independent taxation leads to a substan-
tial reduction in the effective tax rate of a potential second earner married to a high
earner, though rather less than in the case of fully independent taxation. For a
potential second earner married to someone earning an average industrial wage in a
full-time job, the average tax rate on taking up a job falls by just 4 percentage
points. At low earnings, or with an unemployed partner, the rates are not much
changed. By contrast, a fully independent tax system leads to very substantial falls
in average tax rates for second earners in most circumstances.
In the present paper we do not discuss the merits and demerits of these
various systems. We simply wish to investigate the potential labour supply response
to a fully independent tax system which would substantially reduce the effective tax
rates on second earners, and to a"quasi-independent" tax system which would have
more complex effects on effective tax rates, but would be likely to lead to more
moderate reductions in most cases, with some increases.
Table 3: Avern,~e Effective Tiu Rates on Secotut Earnerfor Aáernutive Tiu Systenu
Tnz system
Spouse in fu[[ time work at
Spouse Nalf average Average Twice aver-
unemplayed wage wage age wage
Full-time job ru average wage
Income-splitting 64 40 46 60
Quasi-independent 62 40 42 43
Fully independent 69 29 28 28
Part-tirnejob (ItS haursJ nt average wage
Income-splitting 100 36 34 52
Quasi-independ~nt 100 33 37 42
Fully independent 100 15 15 l5
16 Consider a couple where the man has earnings which would place him at the top tax rate
under an independent system, though only at the standard rate under an "income-splitting" system
if his wife had no earnings. Under an income splitting system, his wife will face the standard rate
of tax after exhausting the earned income allowance. But under quasi-independent taxes she may
face a higher rate. If his wife has no earnings, all her allowances are "unused" and can be set off
against that top tax rate. But for every f100 she earns, the "unused" allowance goes down by the
same amount, so that while her own tax liability is zero, her husband's tax liability increases by
f 100 times the top tax rate: thus the effective tax rate on second earnings is still equal to the top
tax rate.5. Estimation results
In principle, parameters of the labour supply model and the wage equations
can be estimated simultaneously. In order to limit the computational burden
however, we have estimated the wage equations separately, using a reduced form
participation equation to account for selectivity bias. For males and females
separately, the resulting Heckman (1979) model is estimated by maximum likeli-
hood. The lists of regressors used in the equations and the estimation results are
presented in the appendix (Table AI). The wage equation estimates are similar to
those of Callan (1991). Results are in accordance with the usual findings for this
type of human capital wage equations. For example, the expected log wage rises
with education level, and is a concave function of potential experience.
It appears that estimates of the parameters of log y and log'-y in the utility
function are inaccurate and insignificant and, in case of model I1, imply that utility
would be decreasing with y for a substantial ainount of observations. This can be
explained by the fact that these parameters have no direct counterpart in the labour
supply functions. To prevent U decreasing with y, we have added alternatives in
the interior of the budget set to the choice set. These are never chosen. As a conse-
quence, the parameter estimates will be such that their probability is small, imply-
ing that utility increases with income.
We present the estimation results for two structural models in Table A2
(appendix). Both models appropriately account for unobserved wage rates, and
incorporate hours restrictions. The simulated ML estimates are based upon R-15
draws per family. Model I is a neoclassical labour supply model, not accounting
for involuntary unemployment. Information on desired employment status is
discarded, actual employment status is assumed to reflect desired status. Models II
is the generalized double hurdle model. It allows for involuntary unemployment
and takes account of the observed variable I,,, and I~.
It can easily be checked that, according to both models, the utility function is
increasing in family income at all sample points, and quasi-concave at all sample
points but one. Significance levels of most parameters in the utility function (1)-(2)
are rather low. The reason may be that variables enter at several places through
squares and~or cross products. This also implies that parameter estimates them-
selves are not very interesting. The meaning of all parameter estimates jointly will
be discussed below, using auxiliary calculations. An exception is the impact of the
chronic illness dummy. In both models, suffering from chronic íllness strongly
increases the value of male leisure, and thus decreases male labour supply. The
same dummy for the wife hardly plays a role.
The parameters So~, 5~,, S03 and S13 determine the disutility or costs of
part-time jobs. For all part-time jobs, the additional utility term is negative.
Significance levels are quite high. Apparently, the disutility is strongest for jobs
involving fewer hours. This might imply that jobs for one or two days a week are
harder to find than jobs for three or four days a week.I8
In model II, the probability of involuntary unemployment is allowed to
depend on potential experience, education, and a dummy for living in Dublin. We
experimented with other variables, but these were not significant. The education
level has a significantly negative effect for both males and females. For males, the
probability of involuntary unemployment decreases significantly with potential
experience. For females, potential experience is insignificant.
In Figure 2, we have sketched some estimated indifference curves. The
disutilities of part-time jobs are not taken into account. We sketch curves in
(y,h,n)-plane, for h~-20, and curves in (y,h~)-plane, for hm-40. Solid lines refer to
model I, dashed lines to model II. Individual and family characteristics are set
equal to their sample averages, except for family composition: The left panels refer
to a family without children, the righthand panels to a family with one young child.
The curves have the expected convex shape. The main difference between
model I and model II is near zero hours of work. There, the marginal (money-
metric) utility of leisure is much larger according to model I than according to
model II. The explanation is clear: Model I does not account for involuntary
unemployment, so nonworkers have no desire to work. To explain this, the model
values not working more than working. According to model II, the number of
nonworkers desiring to work is substantial. To explain this, the estimated utility
difference between not working and working is much smaller. Note that the costs
of part-time jobs, not shown in the figure, will imply that many people will only
choose between not working and working full-time.
Differences according to family composition are much more pronounced for
females than for males. For both models, indifference curves for females are
steeper in the family with a young child than in the family without children. The
presence of a young child increases the wife's reservation wage and decreases her
participation probability and expected number of hours worked.
In Table 4, we provide 80 per cent confidence intervals of the relevan[
elasticities for the average family.'~ The elasticities are based upon linear budget
sets, i.e. after tax wage rates do not depend on hours worked. They are set equal
to 50 per cent of the average before tax wage rates of males and females in the
sample. We consider elasticities of expected hours worked and participation rates,
taking account of the random errors in the utility function. Account is also taken of
the disutilities of part-time jobs.
The husband's own wage elasticities are extremely small according to both
models. According to model I, it is significantly positive, according to model II it
is insignificant (significance IeveL 10~, one sided). There is not much difference
between the elasticity of the participation probability and that of hours worked,
implying that the elasticity of hours worked conditional on participation is close to
zero. The cross wage elasticities of males are significantly negative, but again
small in absolute magnitude. This also is the case for the income elasticity of male
labour supply. Female labour supply appears to be much more sensitive with
~~ See Van Soest (1992) for computational details.19
respect to wage and income changes than male labour supply. Most of the sensitiv-
ity is in the participation probability. Elasticities of hours worked conditional on
participation are of the same sign as the participation probability elasticities, but
smaller in absolute magnitude. The own wage elasticities according to the two
models are very similar. Perhaps most s[riking in Table 4 are the cross wage
elasticities of female labour supply. These are significant and relatively large, and
suggest that the marginal tax rate on the husband's earnings will affect the wife's
labour supply decision almost as strongly as the marginal tax rate on her own earn-
ings. There is a notable difference in the magnitude of the effect between models I
and II. Finally, the other income elasticities of the wife's hours worked and her
participation probability are all significantly negative. Model II yields a smaller
sensitivity than model I. All females' elasticities are much larger in absolute value
than the males'.~a
Table 4: Elasticities for the average family
wage rate male wage rate female other family income
Q10 Q90 Q10 Q90 Q10 Q90
Model I
hm 0.012 0.043 -0.022 -0.012 -0.042 -0.033
hp -0.622 -0.422 0.560 0.859 -0.521 -0.274
pm 0.014 0.025 -0.019 -0.011 -0.017 -0.008
pf -0.593 -0.405 0.517 0.744 -0.422 -0.200
Model II
hm -0.005 0.022 -0.022 -0.013 -0.035 -0.027
hf -0.443 -0.255 0.554 0.754 -0.186 -0.116
pm 0.006 0.012 -0.014 -0.006 -0.007 -0.003
pf -0.405 -0.242 0.463 0.625 -0.133 -0.077
Explanation.
hm, hf: expected working hours husband and wife, respectively
pm, pf: participation probability husband and wife
Q10: first decile; Q90: ninth decile
All elasticities refer to family with average characteristics.
Wage rates and other income are after tax, wm3.11, wf-2.29,
ofi-40. The budget constraint is linear. Hours restrictions
(eq. (11)) are taken into account.
Results can be compared with those obtained for the Netherlands using
similar models (Van Soc;st, 1992). [n the Netherlands, the male own wage elasticity
is larger (between 0.05 and 0.10), and the male cross wage and other income
elasticity are similar to the values found here. For females, the Dutch own wage
~e To get some idea of the sensitivity of the outcomes with respect to the number of draws in
the simulated ML procedure, we also computed the intervals for estimates of model 11 based on
R-S, R-10 and R-18 draws. Differences with those presented (R-15) appeared to be quite
small. Only for R- I and R-2, we found notaMe differences.20
elasticity is somewhat smaller (between 0.4 and 0.6). The main differences concern
the female cross wage and other income elasticities. These are much smaller in
absolute value according to the Dutch results (between -0.09 and 0.12 (insignifi-
cant), and between -0.01 and 0.03, respectively).
Similar calculations can be used to analyse the ceteris paribus effects of
other explanatory variables. For example, it appears that family composition and
the wife's age of marriage hardly affect the husband's labour supply decision, but
do have an important impact on the wife's participation and hours decision. Results
with respect to family composition correspond to the usual findings (cf. Heckman
and Killingsworth (1986) and Nakamura and Nakamura (1992), for example): in
families without children, the wife will work more than on average, in families
with young children, she works less than on average. Having married at a later age
in the life cycle is an indication for the female's preferences for work. This
variable may be a proxy for unobserved characteristics affecting preferences.
6. Simulations and alternative tax systems
The simulations in this section serve three purposes. The first is to see to
what extent the models are able to reproduce the data. We compare some features
of the sample with those of simulated data (i.e. actual values of exogenous vari-
ables and simulated values of endogenous variables). Secondly, the simulations are
used to consider the sensitivity of average labour supply and participation with
respect to before tax wages. This is simply done by repeating the simulations after
increasing all before tax wage rates of males or females by l0ob. Third, and most
interesting from a policy point of view, the simulations are repeated with alterna-
tive tax systems. Comparing labour supply under the actual tax system with that
under independent or quasi-independent instead of joint taxation shows to what
extent the current tax system in Ireland can be held responsible for low participa-
tion rates among married females.
In Table A3, we compare actual and simulated distributions of working
hours for males and females. Both models are able to capture this feature of the
data to a reasonable extent. The number of males without work is somewhat
overestimated by model 1 and underestimated by model II. Both models overesti-
mate the number of males working about 48 hours per week. The low numbers of
people working part-time are captured quite well, due to the incorporation of
disutility of part-time jobs.
In Table A4, we provide a more detailed picture of the performance of
model I[. We partition the sample according to the wife's education level, her age,
and family size. We compare simulated and actual average hours of work, and the
distribution of couples over the nine possible states: both partners can be voluntary
without work, involuntarily without work, or working. If we consider the sample
as a whole, we find that the model is able to reproduce the sample means of
working hours quite well. It also captures the nine state probabilities reasonably21
well. If we look at means by education level or age class, differences between
sample and simulated data are larger. The model catches the large differences
between male labour supply of those with low and high education level to a limited
extent only. A similar conclusion pertains to differences across labour supply of
females with varying family size.
The simulation results based on changing wages or taxes are presented in
Table 5. We only present the results for the full sample. The direction and magni-
tude of the effects do not vary substantially with age, education level, or family
size. Note the differences between wage elasticities that can be derived from the
simulations and those in Table 4. Not only do we now consider the average over
the sample instead of a representative family, but we also change to before tax
wage rates, and allow the tax and benefits system to determine after-tax incomes
(Table 4 was based upon linear budget sets, no benefits).
Table 5: Simulations wage and tax changes
Sim. h,,, h~ labour force status labour force status
of husband of wife
Modell np un em np un em
I 30.48 6.75 28.95 - 71.04 78.45 - 21.54
II 32.00 6.37 24.47 - 74.53 79.51 - 20.49
III 30.32 7.35 29.27 - 70.73 76.76 - 23.24
IV 30.58 7.05 28.55 - 71.45 77.67 - 22.33
V 30.29 8.27 29.62 - 70.38 74.03 - 25.97
Model II
I 29.29 6.72 9.84 21.82 68.33 58.54 20.20 21.25
II 29.71 6.51 8.43 22.25 69.33 59.68 19.66 20.67
III 29.17 7.23 9.90 21.76 69.13 55.80 21.61 22.58
IV 29.29 6.99 9.58 21.90 68.53 57.31 20.77 21.93
V 29.23 7.71 10.22 21.66 68.10 53.28 22.71 23.99
xp anation: -
hm, ht: average hours worked, males and females (zeros included).
np: nonparticipant; un: unemployed; em: employed.
I: actual tax system (joint taxation) and wages.
II: before tax wage rates males raised by 10 per cent.
III: before tax wage rates females raised by 10 per cent.
IV: quasi-independent taxation.
V: fully independent taxation.22
If all males' before tax wage rates rise by 10 per cent, average hours
worked by males rise by almost 5 per cent (model I) or 1.4 per cent (model II).
These own wage elasticities are much larger than those in Table 4. Female hours
decrease by 5.6 per cent (model I) or 3.1 per cent (model II). The decrease in the
females' employment rate is of similar magnitude. The effect of a 10 per cent
increase in females' wage rates on male labour supply is quite small (-0.5 per cent
and -0.4 per cent). The females' own wage response is quite substantial, however:
average hours worked increase by 8.9 per cent (model I) or 7.6 per cent (model
II). Again, these effects exceed those in Table 4.
The final simulations concern the two alternative tax systems described in
section 4, each designed to be approximately revenue-neutral in the absence of any
behavioural response. The benefi[s system remains unchanged. The first option,
quasi-independent taxation, is a limited move towards independent taxation,
whereby the transferability of rate bands between spouses is done away with, and
only "unused" allowances can be transferred. The estimated effects for males are
small. We predict an increase in the employment rate and hours worked by less
than 0.5 per cent. The effects for females are larger. Female hours would rise by
about 4 per cent. The increase in the employment rate is somewhat smaller.
According to model II, participation increases substantially, but many of the
females entering the labour market would not be able to find a job. Involuntary
unemployment would rise by almost 3 per cent.
Finally, we consider a fully independent individual tax system, which
implies much lower rates of tax on second earners. All tax rates are cut by more
than one quarter: the standard rate of tax falls by almost 10 percentage points. The
effects on males are modest. The employment rate would slightly fall, due to an
increase in nonparticipation. The fall in average hours worked is even smaller. For
females, the effects are much larger. Hours worked would rise by 22.5 per cent
(model I) or 14.7 per cen[ (model II). According to model I, nonparticipation
would decrease by 4.4 percentage points, resulting in an increase in the employ-
ment rate of more than 20 per cent. According to model II, the increase in the
participation rate is similar. Many of those entering the labour market, however,
would end up being unemployed. The employment rate would increase by 2.74
percentage points, or 12.9 per cent. According to both models, these effects are
largely due to increasing participation of females whose husband is employed. The
probability that both partners take the same labour supply decision increases.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have considered two static structural models in an attempt
to explain the labour supply of husband and wife in Irish families. By restricting
our attention to a finite budget set we were able to take account of the main
features of the Irish system of income taxes and benefits, a key point being that
benefits and taxes depend essentially on joint income. We also took account of23
hours restrictions, and of the fact that wage rates of nonworkers are not observed.
The models were estimated with smooth simulated maximum likelihood, using the
ESRI household cross-section data drawn in 1987.
In the first model, we do not allow for involuntary unemployment. In the
second model, we fully incorporate information on involuntary unemployment in
the model. This has substantial effects on estimates of labour supply elasticities,
although their sign and order of magnitude remains the same. Our interpretation of
the data implies that a discouraged worker is considered involuntarily unemployed.
This is theoretically appropriate in the labour supply model, but leads to unemploy-
ment figures which are much larger than the official ones. As a consequence, our
participation rates are no[ directly comparable to published data for Ireland and
other countries. The direction and size of the effects identified in our sample can,
however, provide some guidance on the extent to which the tax and benefits system
contribute to the relatively low labour force participation rate of married women in
Ireland.
Our model estimates enabled us to consider the consequences of joint
taxation versus alternative tax systems. We find that changing to fully independent
taxation in a revenue-neutral way could lead to an increase of the employment rate
of married females in the age group considered of 2.7 percentage points, while the
gross participation rate (discouraged workers included) would rise by 5.26 percen-
tage points. The effects on male labour supply would be only slightly negative.
These results suggest that the tax system could explain a part - but only a part - of
the gap between the participation rates of married women in Ireland and those for
women in other EC countries which have greater independence in the tax treatment
of husbands and wives.19
A fuller investigation of cross-country differences in labour supply would
require comparable micro data, and the construction of budget constraints for the
countries involved. Gíven these inputs, the model set out here can in principle be
used to study the impact of differing tax and benefit systems and of other factors
which may lead to labour supply differences between countries. Labour supply
differentials could be decomposed into, for example, differences due to tax and
benefit systems, real wage levels, numbers of children, age distributions, etc. This
is beyond the scope of the present paper, although we want to give one example
for illustration. Irish families are quite large. We constructed a comparable data set
of Dutch families of the same age category in 1987, and found that the average
number of children was 1.17, compared to 2.10 in Ireland. A very rough calcula-
tion based on model II suggests that, if family composition in Ireland were similar
to that in the Netherlands, the employment cate of married women would have
19 The tully independent benchmark is not found in any EC country.za
been 2.9 percentage points higher. Gross participation would increase by 4.9
percentage points.'-o
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APPENDIZ
Table A1. Estimation results Heckman (1979) model
males femalea
par t val par t val
participation equation
conetant -61.68 -2.32 -22.16 -1.09
potexpk0.1 0.02 0.02 -0.25 -0.35
potexp-2~0.01 0.03 0.26 0.01 0.10
dedlev 2 0.47 3.50 0.08 0.51
dedlev 3 0.77 3.71 0.34 1.90
dedlev 4 1.54 5.41 0.36 1.77
dedlev 5 2.01 4.55 0.51 1.81
dedlev 6 2.73 4.74 1.30 3.32
euer~0.01 1.84 1.61 -0.95 -0.87
ruertw~0.01 -3.59 -1.24 0.34 0.12
bigtown 0.23 1.52 0.06 0.36
city -0.33 -2.05 0.13 0.79
dublin 0.43 3.20 0.09 0.69
log-aqe 33.47 2.21 12.91 1.10
loq-age-2 -4.55 -2.13 -1.92 -1.12
hhlth -1.06 -8.32 -0.32 -2.11
nchcb -0.14 -3.54 -0.23 -4.95
yng0 4 0.15 0.84 -0.54 -3.06
yng5-12 -0.01 -0.05 -0.15 -1.00
ncapyx0.01 -0.38 -2.93 -0.39 -1.18
agemarwx0.1 0.27 2.06 0.35 2.44
wage equation
conetant 0.86 3.37 1.46 3.30
potexpw0.1 0.40 4.60 0.40 2.31
potexp-2~0.01 -0.06 -3.53 -0.08 -2.34
dedlev 2 0.19 4.35 0.15 1.19
dedlev 3 0.28 4.05 0.32 2.66
dedlev 4 0.51 6.79 0.36 2.89
dedlev 5 0.66 6.82 0.69 5.58
dedlev 6 0.92 9.23 0.97 5.43
euer"0-01 -0.36 -1.08 -0.92 -1.05
ruertw~0.01 -0.55 -0.58 -3.46 -1.57
bigtown 0.09 2.10 0.04 0.32
city 0.10 1.51 -0.03 -0.25
dublin 0.14 3.50 0.19 2.02
eigma(w) 0.37 33.02 0.47 12.60
tan(1.571~rho) -0.94 -2.15 0.73 1.3927
Table A2. Estimation results structural modela
Model I Model II





log y log lm
log y log lf
log y
log lm
log lm log agem





log lm agemarw ~ 0.1
log 1~
log 1~ log agef





log lf agemarw ~ 0.1
log lm log 1~
log lm Log 1~ log agef
log lm log 1~ log agef sqd
log 1,~ log 1~ dillnf
log lm log 1~ nch
log lm log l~ dch~5
log 1,,, log 1~ dch5-12
log lm log 1~ agemarw k 0.1












-1.463 -2.96 -1.123 -2.01
-1.804 -3.96 -3.792 -7.08
-4.800 -4.97 -6.564 -6.81
-0.616 -1.67 -0.154 -0.37
-0.652 -1.66 -1.021 -2.46
29.539 2.95 25.807 2.29
69.801 1.90 91.407 1.65
-28.885 -1.50 -28.435 -0.96
3.897 1.46 4.254 1.04
2.470 8.33 3.532 9.57
2.267 1.19 3.456 2.20
0.258 0.06 -0.476 -0.10
3.031 0.55 -3.666 -0.73
0.420 0.09 -5.284 -1.33
67.389 1.46 147.553 2.84
-17.508 -0.68 -43.360 -1.51
3.189 0.88 6.899 1.71
1.045 1.79 0.439 0.74
2.802 1.66 3.720 2.62
2.033 0.50 0.960 0.23
3.105 0.63 -3.011 -0.67
-0.652 -0.16 -6.237 -1.69
5.097 1.47 -8.541 -1.52
-2.504 -1.34 3.871 1.25
0.378 1.43 -0.521 -1.21
-0.025 -0.70 -0.069 -1.23
-0.279 -1.27 -0.432 -2.38
-0.053 -0.10 0.065 0.12
-0.373 -0.58 0.399 0.68
-0.111 -0.21 0.623 1.34
-6.757 -10.90 -5.191 -7.58
0.155 7.56 0.114 5.10
-4.344 -14.55 -3.374 -11.45








pot expf 0.203 0.61
pot expf sqd -0.029 -0.41
ed levelf -0.151 -3.00
ddublin -0.278 -1.85
Explanation:
Simulated Maximum Likelihood, R-15 draws per obaervation; 1001 observationa
Model I: Involuntary unemployment not taken into account
Model II: Involuntary unemployment taken into account28
Table A3. Actual and simulated hours distributions
males
houre actual model I model II
0 30.87 31.67 28.96
8 0.40 0.12 0.10
16 0.20 0.42 0.38
24 1.10 1.76 1.66
32 6.59 6.29 6.43
40 35.86 30.98 33.44
48 15.68 21.56 21.01
56 9.29 7.21 8.03
femalee









Table A4. Actual and simulated hours worked and labour market etates
male state np
female state np
hours worked hm h~
Sample diatribution
educ. level 1,2 22.51 3.20 14.0
3 26.78 4.04 4.2
4 36.62 7.95 3.1
~-5 35.15 10.94 3.0
age ~30 29.45 12.40 1.0
30-39 31.71 6.06 5.0
40-49 27.72 4.71 9.9
~-50 27.85 3.26 12.3
family size 2 29.69 12.23 9.4
3 30.42 9.66 7.1
4 30.72 5.21 5.3
~-5 27.92 2.96 6.6
all families 29.51 6.48 6.8
Simulated distribution, model II
educ. level 1,2 24.91 3.49 10.5
3 27.29 6.04 6.4
4 32.19 7.72 3.4
~-5 33.83 10.11 2.4
age
np np un un un em em em
un em np un em np un em
1.6 1.2 22.0 5.6 1.9 40.4 6.2 7.1
0.9 2.8 15.3 11.6 3.2 38.9 14.4 8.8
0.6 0.6 3.7 2.5 6.2 50.3 13.0 19.9
0.7 1.0 4.3 4.0 4.0 38.1 16.9 28.1
0.0 0.5 13.6 12.1 4.0 27.3 12.6 28.8
0.0 1.4 11.1 4.7 4.5 44.0 14.5 14.8
2.8 1.4 12.4 4.3 2.8 42.6 11.3 12.4
1.2 2.5 13.0 3.7 1.9 48.1 8.6 8.6
1.3 3.1 7.5 3.8 4.4 34.0 8.2 28.3
0.9 1.4 11.8 3.3 2.8 35.8 12.3 24.5
0.7 1.1 12.1 6.4 4.6 43.4 14.2 12.1
1.1 0.9 14.9 8.0 2.6 45.3 12.6 8.0
1.0 1.4 12.3 5.9 3.5 41.0 12.3 15.9
2.3 1.5 18.8 5.1 3.0 39.6 11.6 7.5
2.1 2.0 15.3 6.1 4.9 36.4 14.4 12.3
1.1 1.8 9.1 4.8 5.1 42.2 15.2 17.4
1.1 2.9 5.6 3.7 5.4 41.8 14.4 22.7
~30 30.17 11.26 1.9 0.8 1.5 11.9 7.2 8.4 28.4 16.9 22.8
30-39 30.63 7.25 4.4 1.6 2.1 11.8 5.0 4.6 39.5 14.8 16.1
40-49 28.32 4.58 9.3 2.2 2.4 12.2 3.6 2.6 44.9 11.8 10.6
~-50 26.90 3.72 9.2 2.0 2.1 15.3 3.5 2.4 46.6 10.2 8.7
family size 2 28.99 9.24 3.9
3 28.91 8.06 6.0
4 29.39 7.05 5.5
~-5 29.57 4.49 7.6
2.0 2.4 30.5 6.1 5.8 33.7 16.9 18.7
1.9 2.3 11.2 5.3 4.9 35.1 15.6 17.6
1.6 1.8 12.8 5.2 5.0 38.0 14.5 15.6
1.6 2.0 13.9 3.7 3.2 47.4 10.2 10.4
all families 29.29 6.72 6.1 1.7 2.1 12.5 4.9 4.5 40.0 13.6 14.729
Figure 1: Average Ejj`ective Tax Rates facing Porential Second Earner:









0 8 16 24 32 40
Hours per weekat average wage
~ Fulty independeni faxn } Eamer 1 unemployed ~ El onhalrave wage







Notes: 1. The top four effective rate schedules are for the system of taxation which operated
in [reland in 1987: a couple's tax liability depends essentially on their joint income,
because of "income-splitting" provisions.
2. The effective rate schedule illustrated for fully independent taxation includes a
proportiona[e revenue neu[ral reduction in all income [ax rates, of about one-quarter.
This schedule applies irrespective of the eamings of the spouse, except where the
spouse is unemployed, in which case the schedule is similar the topmost schedule.
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